I. Introduction
It is likely that the world is only at the beginning of what will in the end be a period of massive change in the banking industry. The global financial crisis resulted in extreme losses, the full ex-ante extent of which, at the most critical periods, will never be fully known. To avoid failure many major banks employed less than transparent ways of dealing with mark-to-market losses, and regulators and policy makers had to make decisions in the trade-offs between transparency and the costs of bank resolutions and government guarantees. The unprecedented use of central bank balance sheets in response to the urgent demands for liquidity of interconnected financial firms provided a breathing space. The regulatory response has been extensive -including the move towards Basel III, revised trading book rules, Dodd-Frank, including the separation of proprietary trading (Volcker rule) and separation of retail from wholesale banking under the Vickers report in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, and despite all of this, banks continue to take big securities markets positions and mix these with traditional retail banking activities that carry implicit and explicit guarantees. Large unexpected losses can arise from such bets on fair-value-through-profit-or-loss products. While never transparent, market knowledge filters through counterparty linkages triggering solvency fears and, from these, critical liquidity crises arise between interconnected firms. These liquidity mechanisms cannot be hidden, and result either in failures or (with official support present) to balance sheet adjustments often referred to as "deleveraging". The inability of firms to model and control these risks remains painfully evident -even after all the reforms and promises to improve governance since 2008: the most recent examples being JP Morgan, Dexia, MUFG, UBS and others. There is some fear that banks own attempts to restore their balance sheets to health and their need to deleverage to comply with all of the new regulations may lead to retrenchment that could exacerbate the current weakness in global economic activity.
The financial industry and its lobby groups have argued that the regulatory agenda is too "aggressive and restrictive", and is intensifying a deleveraging process already under way. 1 As this paper will show, this issue is not at all straightforward and hinges on: how authorities" have addressed capital shortages and liquidity issues; how deleveraging is brought about by banks" own internal decisions; and, importantly, the different business model structures of individual banks.
It is often argued that deleveraging is "bad" if occurs via asset contraction, because this is more damaging for the economy. Good deleveraging, on the other hand, supposedly occurs where banks raise more capital: 2  Banks may delever by cutting assets via their loan book, which is presumably the most damaging to real activity. Alternatively, asset deleveraging may occur by cutting fair-value-through-profit-or-loss capital markets assets, either by reducing positions or via falling prices.
 "Good" deleveraging may occur by raising new equity, or by reducing dividends, executive compensation and share buybacks in favour of retained earnings. Raising more capital via bond-like products that are untested in a crisis situation cannot be described as good deleveraging: markets for bond-like securities are notoriously illiquid in such periods -at precisely the moment that capital is required.
 A particularly unsatisfactory way of deleveraging is to focus on reducing riskweighted assets to which the Basel capital rules apply (raising the Tier 1 ratio) via internal model calibration of risks and the creative use of derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDS).
Bank business models appear to have played an important role in the question of leverage. Where banks have significant securities businesses, particularly large gross market values of derivatives, their leverage tends to move around sharply in a procyclical way contaminating traditional banking activities and giving rise to periodic liquidity crises. This paper explores the extent of banking deleveraging at the aggregate level and for a number of large banking groups, and focuses on the implications for policy. The aggregate credit data are examined in section II. However, this system-wide data involves diverse banks and data concepts that leave one less than clear about the influences at work -particularly for large interconnected capital markets banks that are too big to fail (TBTF) and whose role in the crisis have motivated many of the regulatory changes. For this reason deleveraging in the banks that are a part of the Globally Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) is considered in section III. Section IV turns to policy, and explores all of the nuances of the influence on deleveraging of the capital and liquidity rules. Section V examines the reasons for policies of separating traditional banking from securities market activities, and their likely impact on deleveraging and financial stability. Finally some concluding comments are made in section VI.
II. Bank retrenchment to date
Concern about deleveraging has been driven by the fear that bank retrenchment would limit the extension of credit to worthy private borrowers. This issue has to be seen in an overall context:  At the macroeconomic level, demand conditions associated with the economic cycle influences lending outcomes and, in an era of high budget deficits, noninflationary monetary policies will insure some degree of "crowding out" of private borrowers; and  From the perspective of banks, much of their leverage may support interbank activity which is not reflected in national accounts data for borrowing and lending by sectors.
Overall, while available data clearly reflect the impact of the cycle on credit demand and, during 2011, banks" shift to cash and interbank claims, they do not suggest overall shrinkage of bank balance sheets in the United States or Europe since the 2009 recession.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show US, European and UK credit developments, respectively. In all three countries lending tends to lag the cycle. Lending to non-financial firms tends to be more cyclical and in the case of the USA can pull back sharply and for prolonged periods following episodes of financial stress (the dot.com bust and the subprime crisis. More recently US commercial and industrial loans have picked up much more strongly than elsewhere lending support to the idea that the US financial system is further along the road to healing than in Europe. Mortgage lending in the US remains weak, as house prices remain under pressure. In contrast, the failure of lending to firms and households to pick up in Europe and the UK since 2010 suggests that the financial system is still unable to support the economy. Demand-side factors are playing a role alongside banking system troubles, as confidence and crisis dynamics affect the real economy. The aggregate picture for Europe hides cross-country differences between the north and the south, and the five crisis countries in particular. Figure 4 shows the situation in larger EU countries. French corporations have been obtaining more credit than those in Germany (where state-owned banks have struggled) and more recently with respect to Italy too, where the sovereign debt crisis is affecting banks. Figure 5 shows that concerns about strong deleveraging have been more justified in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, and the contraction of credit is almost certainly more supply-driven in those countries. Lending to households is dominated by mortgages, shown in Figure 6 for the larger EU countries. Germany shows no signs of a boom bust cycle, but in France and Italy the nascent recovery after the 2009 recession appears to be slowing again. The smaller countries shown in Figure 7 include those that suffered a housing boom and bust. Credit contraction in these countries continues. This is not very encouraging for the outlook in these countries. From the perspective of the system as a whole, the evidence for bank balance sheet shrinkage the since recovery from the 2009 recession is mixed. In the United States asset growth in the system during 2011 was rapid, more than 10%, once derivative activity of the largest banks is taken into account, and still at least in line with potential growth, at more than 4%, if it is not (Table 1) . Asset growth in Euro Area banks has averaged nearly 4% for the past two years, also not suggestive of a credit crunch. In the United Kingdom the picture is less robust, as the system"s balance sheet continued to contract during 2010 and its growth during 2011, while positive, was still quite low.
The composition of the system balance sheets suggests mixed support for the "credit crunch" hypothesis. Most of the asset expansion reflects the large increases in cash/near cash during 2011, as quantitative easing has kicked in, and items which include external lending and derivatives. The main items reflecting credit expansion to support economic activity, loans and securities, have shown little or negative growth apart from securities in the United States.
A more direct though qualitative measurement of credit crunch pressures may be obtained from bank loan officer surveys. The lending surveys of the ECB and the US Federal Reserve are shown as simple averages of all their components in Figure 8 , providing more light on developments in those areas. The extreme nature of the supplyside credit crunch in 2008 is clear in both the USA and the Euro Area for households and enterprises. Symmetrically demand weakened too due to the onset of recession and falling confidence about the future. A more divergent pattern emerged in 2011. In the United States supply and demand conditions in the lending surveys appear to have normalised. In the Euro Area, credit standards appear to be tightening again. 
III. G-SIFI's derivatives and deleveraging
G-SIFIs are examined separately because they are not only large in their own economies, but also play a role in global capital markets products where counterparty risk is so important. The 22 banks were selected with a view to containing all of the large holding companies and investment banks that own banking licenses (allowing them to benefit from access to the central discount window and lender-of-last-resort functions, deposit insurance and other such implicit subsidisation of their business models). Sufficient geographical coverage of countries that have been prominent in the global financial crisis was also a consideration. The banks covered are:
 To make the US banks as comparable as possible to their European counterparts, the gross market value of derivatives (GMV), not including hedging derivatives, is added back into the US bank figures.
3 The leverage ratio is total assets (so defined) versus tangible equity, i.e. equity less goodwill and other intangibles. Figure 9 shows the deleveraging trends for this G-SIFI group of banks on this basis. The overall trend in the leverage ratio is downwards, but from very high starting levels of more than 40. The latest global average at the end of 2011 is 30 times, which sits well above the level of 20-times (5% equity ratio) that the OECD prefers as being "wellcapitalised".
4 The country differences are quite striking. Germany at one extreme is at 43-times equity at the end of 2011, while the USA and the UK have managed to reduce leverage versus equity to around 24 times (even after allowing for IFRS derivatives in the case of the USA).
The detailed bank positions for the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets (RWA) are shown in the upper panel of Figure 10 A number of features stand out:
 All G-SIFIs have high Tier I ratios, so that no further deleveraging from this source should be expected this year. The pressure on banks in Europe will presumably be on smaller banks with business models focused more on lending to domestic households, local governments and to small and medium-sized firms (SMEs).
 The ease with which Tier 1 targets are achieved and exceeded is not mirrored in equity ratios. While all banks bar two (DBK and ACA) have already achieved the undemanding potential future 3% leverage ratio of Basel III, only 5 of the 22 banks have a ratio at or above 5%. Banks in the USA received capital injections during the crisis, and 3 of them have relatively high equity positions. The two US specialist investment banks have very high Tier 1 ratios but relatively weaker equity positions.
 The overall picture is very uneven. Two of the US G-SIFIs are "well capitalised". German French and Swiss banks are weakly capitalised in equity, despite very high Tier 1 ratios. The two periphery countries appear to have well capitalised banks, but face more pressure due to the sovereign debt crisis. The UK is similar to the USA, with one bank (HSBA) above the 5% equity ratio level.
As noted in previous papers, the Basel Tier I ratio concept is a very poor measure of bank "safety" due to the ability of G-SIFI banks to use their internal models to adjust risk weights ("risk weight optimisation"), to use derivatives to engage in regulatory arbitrage and because authorities cannot agree that only genuine equity should be included as bank capital. 5 Here it is worth noting that the most recent G-SIFI failure was Dexia: in a recent press release explaining events the bank reported in the Financials Appendix 1 a total equity position consisting of -€320m in December 2011, i.e. negative net equity failure, while their Tier 1 and core Tier 1 ratios in Appendix 2 were a relatively healthy 7.6% and 6.4%, respectively. 6 It is intriguing that the public debate on these issues continues to focus on the Basel ratios, as though relate to banks actual balance sheets and the question of a bank failure. In fact the most common cause of bank failure is a "funding hole" in the banks actual balance sheet and, in particular, the inability to meet margin calls on derivatives and related collateral issues. 
G-SIFI good versus bad deleveraging
Deleveraging is often said to be bad if it occurs via asset contraction, because this is more damaging for the economy. Deleveraging may also argued to be bad if it occurs by manipulating RWA through regulatory arbitrage, because the intent is to minimise the holding of capital. Good deleveraging is said to occur where banks raise more capital. Figure 11 shows equity less goodwill, Tier 1 capital, total bank assets (TA, including the 
 Loans versus Total Assets:
In countries where investment banking is most important (The USA, the UK, Switzerland, Germany and France), there are some striking differences worthy of comment. The rise in TA versus loans in the USA during 2008 reflects merger activity but subsequent volatility in TA is not reflected in loan activity, suggesting the importance of derivatives and other capital markets products in balance sheet movements. The 2 US investment banks are dominated by these products, though loans in one of these institutions have expanded sharply from a small base. In Europe and Switzerland, derivatives positions tend to have been forced down or held steady since the crisis so that loans have risen somewhat relative to TA, or, as in the case of Spain, are moving together. 8 The 2 large Spanish banks have seen some loan growth over the crisis period, and since earlier analysis showed the reverse for the full Spanish banking sector, one can only assume that this has occurred in other regions such as Latin America (reflecting their diversified business models). If one allows for the distortions caused by mergers in the UK and Germany, there is little evidence of G-SIFI banks in the rest of Europe expanding their loan books. 
US Universal banks
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While loan growth in G-SIFI banks appears no better in the USA than Europe, capital positions have improved and concerns about bank solvency have improved in the USA but not in Europe where the average bank price-to-book ratio is around 0.5 versus back to parity in the USA. It concerns about solvency that lead to funding issues and in the limit runs on deposits, which is a concern in Europe in 2012. The use of large TARP-style injections of capital into European banks is an option that is touched on in section IV below.
Contributions to total asset growth in investment banking countries
The contributions to G-SIFI total quarterly asset growth from cash, loans, debt securities and derivatives are shown in Figure 12 for the USA (the 4 universal banks), the UK, Germany and France (combined) and Switzerland. In all cases total asset growth is dominated by what is happening to derivatives exposure. positions that are netted. Profits are made on fees and pricing rather than open position betting.
 Derivatives contributions are highly correlated with any global measure of the cycle in risk (here the VIX index).
The policy implications of these observations will be taken up, following the discussion of regulatory capital policies. 
IV. Deleveraging pressures and policies relating to capital adequacy and liquidity

Basel III rules (Pillar 1)
Following G-20 agreement on Basel III reforms banks will be required to comply with rising minima for regulatory capital ratios. Most importantly they will be required to raise their holdings of the new, all-equity, "Core Tier 1" capital measure to 4.5% of riskweighted assets (RWA) by 2015 and to 7.0% by 2019. It should be noted that both Core Tier 1 capital and RWA contain changes to definitions or rules for calculating them which make complying with requirements more demanding than under Basel II. How much of a challenge will this be? Table 2 summarises the situation at the end of 2009 as reported in late 2010 in Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS) and by the European Banking Authority (EBA).
9 It also provides June 2011 updated information about European banks provided in an EBA Monitoring Exercise. 10 The QIS studies, whose coverage of European banks heavily overlaps, cover nearly all diversified, internationally active banks whose Tier 1 capital exceeds €3 billion (Group 1 banks) in G-20 economies and a sample of smaller banks (Group 2 banks).
11 35 of 91 large banks submitting data in the G-20 sample were European and for smaller banks the G-20 sample appears to be dominated by the European banks. Results suggest that: 
Other considerations (Basel Pillars 2 and 3)
The OECD has noted in the past that the scope for arbitraging the risk-weight system, the use of Basel II netting for derivative positions and the very slow Basel III transition period make Pillar 1 rules far too undemanding to serve as a basis for a sound regulatory environment. Especially in Europe, this becomes clear once one focuses on actual, i.e. not risk-weighted, balance sheets. Table 3 reports aggregate banking system information for the United States, the Euro Area and the United Kingdom, together with implied Core Tier 1 requirements based on varying criteria of increasing stringency. For comparison, actual tangible equity and implied Core Tier 1 capital based on assumptions informed by the QIS studies and the 2012 EBA Monitoring Exercise relating these two variables are reported. Industry estimates 12 of regulatory "common equity", evidently a proxy for Core Tier1 capital, are also provided. For the United States, two sets of figures are given: one based on reported FDIC data; the other reflecting OECD adjustments for derivative positions at 6 major banking groups to make the GAAP-based figures more comparable to IFRS-based European accounts.
On the basis of standard GAAP reporting, the US banking system appears much less leveraged than the European system. This is reflected in the various measures of actual equity capital as shares of tangible assets that are in most cases more than double the European figures. A key factor explaining this difference is that the risk-weighting system exonerates a much smaller share of the total asset base from capital requirements, reflected in the high RWA/TA ratio. This appears to be an accounting mirage. Once adjustment for derivative positions in line with IFRS reporting for large groups are incorporated the RWA/TA ratio is very similar to European levels. However, even after these adjustments are taken into account, the US system appears less leveraged than its European counterparts. All listed ratios 13 measuring equity backing are considerably higher for the US and the various measures of equity capital approach even the most demanding standard listed. Euro Area and UK banks, on the other hand, are already roughly in line with eventual (i.e. 2019) Basel requirements but fall short of more demanding standards. This would be especially true if the summer-2011 industry estimate for Euro Area "common equity" failed to anticipate write-downs related to the sovereign debt crisis late in the year. The need for more capital in Europe has become widely recognised with the result that Basel Pillars 2 (supervision) and 3 (market discipline) have overridden the formal Pillar 1 framework agreed in 2010: Refinancing Operations (LTRO) by the ECB since late last year, have had stabilizing effects. But market discipline continues to force many banks into positions more defensive than anything mandated by the basic Pillar 1 regulatory framework.
The challenge facing the European Union
While weakness of private sector demand has contributed to the slow credit expansion in Europe it is clear that, at least going forward, bank retrenchment will be a negative force. This seems likely to continue until balance sheets are less stretched. Given the market pressure, there is little to be gained in the short term by relaxing supervisory pressure on banks to strengthen their capital bases. To do so would be to invite a repeat of recent crises.
How much capital do European banks need?
Assessing capital needs requires a benchmark measure of what would constitute a "comfortable" situation that would relieve most banks from the pressure to retrench. There is no definitive answer to this. Regulatory requirements provide reference points but, given that these appear insufficient, a 5% leverage ratio, here the ratio of Core Tier 1 capital to (non-risk-weighted) tangible assets is used as a more demanding benchmark. It should also be noted that calculations based on aggregate data almost certainly understate appropriate capital levels because they do not fully reflect international operations, they neglect off-balance sheet activity and excess capital in well-capitalised banks is not available to weakly capitalised banks should they need it.
Based on the indicators reported in Table 3 , increases in Core Tier 1 capital in the Euro Area and the United Kingdom to comply with eventual Basel rules (7% of RWA) are negligible and may not even be necessary (Table 4 ). The temporary 9% target now being demanded by the European authorities for major banks, if applied system-wide on the basis of end-2011 balance sheets and risk-weights, would require something more substantial: nearly €300 billion in the Euro Area and around GBP 85 billion in the United Kingdom.
On the same basis the "well-capitalised" 5% of non-risk-weighted assets standard suggests substantially larger adjustments are necessary: the shortfall amounts to more than €700 billion in the Euro Area and GBP 175 billion in the United Kingdom. These are consistent with industry estimates of a required increase in "common equity" of €678 billion and GBP 150 billion, over four years, in a central "Core regulatory change scenario"
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.
Except for the industry estimates these are all static calculations, i.e. they allow nothing for asset expansion by the banking system. Indeed, the industry scenario envisages a contraction of credit to the private sector of around 11% by the end of 2015
15
. If, however, the banking system is to experience growth, say, in line with nominal GDP that reflects potential growth and some, modest, inflation then additional capitalisation will be necessary to provide backing for the increased lending. If growth of nominal GDP were to amount to 5%, the needed increase in equity to comply with the temporary 9% target would nearly double to €560 billion and GBP 150 billion over four years. To meet the "well-capitalised" 5% leverage benchmark, €1075 billion in the Euro Area and more than GBP 260 billion in the United Kingdom would be needed over four years. This would be nearly €1400 billion in total.
How much new capital will be raised on present plans?
Following the EBA"s capital exercise last autumn to assess the adequacy of EU banks" capital relative to the 9% of RWA temporary target, shortfalls amounting to €115 billion were identified in 31 banks. All but one of these was in the Euro Area
16
. Some €30 billion of this relating to Greek banks is being addressed in the context of the Greek rescue package and three other banks 17 are being restructured separately, leaving a shortfall of €78 billion. Plans to cover this have been submitted which envisage raising €98 billion, some 26% more than required by the EBA
18
. This may be less than it seems. Of the €98 billion, only around ¾, or slightly less than the €78 billion shortfall, will involve increases in Core Tier 1 capital. Of this less than €50 billion will involve new money from retained earnings and outside investors, with much of the remainder consisting of restructuring of hybrids and "other mitigating measures"
19 . The other 1/4 will come, less helpfully, from reductions in RWA of around €250 billion, mainly via asset disposals, reductions in lending 20 and adjustments to models used to calculate risk weights. €50 billion is a fairly small figure relative to the amounts identified above as likely to be needed to free Euro Area banks from pressure to retrench. Of this, much seems likely to consist of retained earnings. Given share prices well below book value in the EU banking sector (Figure 15 ), raising significant amounts of equity from outside investors would require considerable dilution of existing holdings. This makes banks reluctant. Rights issues avoid this problem but may require unrealistically large calls on existing shareholders on unfavourable terms. The large Unicredito €7.5 billion issue in January, for example, amounted to 60% of the bank"s existing market capitalisation and had to be priced at a 43% discount to its theoretical ex-rights price to attract funds. It should be noted, too, that not all banks are quoted companies. Overall it appears that unless retentions can gradually generate significant increases in shareholders" funds, and barring large injections of public money, that the pressure on banks to shrink or restrain growth of balance sheets will not abate. 
Scope for retentions
Operating profits are the original source of any retentions available to strengthen banks" equity positions. These depend importantly on net interest receipts, which in turn depend on both spreads in the market and balance sheet size, and during 2009-10 amounted to just under 0.9% of consolidated assets in the EU banking system annually. They also include trading gains on securities and foreign exchange which were positive in 2009-10 but involve some risk and in difficult conditions, as in 2008, may involve losses. If these operating profits can be maintained they would generate around €1275 billion cumulatively over the period to 2015 in the event of no asset growth and around €1430 billion if assets rose by 5% p.a. These amounts are in line with what appears necessary to meet the most demanding criteria discussed above, and if fully used to recapitalise banks (i.e. not distributed) would suggest that deleveraging pressures could ease between now and 2015. However, they take no account of losses, impairments or tax (considered below).
Is there scope for strengthening operating profits? The two main variables which could contribute are:  Net interest income, which tends to respond favourably to easy monetary policy; and  Staff costs, which are widely perceived by the public as generous, if not excessive, and could be discouraged.
These can help but probably not by large amounts
As regards monetary policy, interest rates fell sharply nearly everywhere following the Lehman Brothers collapse, so operating profits based on 2009-10 conditions already reflect low interest rates. While there is doubtless some scope for the ECB to follow the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan in moving to a zero interest rate policy (and the Bank of England to something close to that), the prospective benefit to banks, in terms of spreads relative to 2009-10, seems limited. The large quantitative easing provided by LTRO lending of three year money to banks at 1%, which for now has greatly eased the immediate crisis, may appear more promising. While its primary effect has been to assure liquidity, it has also provided banks with an opportunity to recapitalise by buying assets with significantly higher returns, which, after taxes, can be retained to strengthen balance sheets. Gross lending under the LTRO to date has amounted to just over €1000 billion which, if entirely used to purchase high yielding Spanish or Italian debt of maturity similar to that of the LTRO funds, could generate cumulative returns of in the range of €100-150, all going well 21 . However, these potentially high returns reflect default risk associated with much Euro Area sovereign debt and avoiding this by investing in, say, German Bunds at less than 2% (implying a 1% margin) would reduce this figure to less than €30 billion. Furthermore, the funds have not all been used for additional asset purchases but to facilitate other balance sheet operations, including repayment of other refinancing operations. Thus following the second LTRO tranche, the €1000 billion lent to banks is reflected, as of 8 May 2012, in an ECB total balance sheet expansion of not much more than €500 billion since early December, before the program began. Thus a more realistic estimate of the contribution of the LTRO to recapitalizing Euro Area banks over three years might be less than €60 billion in the best case and €15 billion if default risk is to be minimised.
As regards staff costs, scope for cash savings, as opposed to equity-related bonuses, may be more symbolic than material in terms of the system"s solvency. Total staff costs in the EU banking sector in 2010 were €230 billion, slightly up on the previous year. A reduction of 10% would yield enhancements to operating earnings of around €100 billion cumulatively by 2015. While helpful, this would not alter the overall picture very much.
The great unknown: losses and impairments
Even in the best of circumstances losses and impairments are part of the business of banking. These must either be covered by operating profits or deductions from existing capital. Considerable judgment goes into deciding how and when to provide for and recognise losses and impairments on positions that are not yet closed and banks have reasonable discretion in this regard. As a result the scope for using retentions to strengthen bank capital positions is a function of: (i) recorded losses, provisions and impairments; and (ii) latent losses not yet acknowledged. Provisions and impairments in the EU during 2008-10, amounting to nearly €700 billion, reflect the severity of the crisis, and cannot be extrapolated as reflecting normal business conditions. But equally, some meaningful amount can be expected. If this amount ran to half of 2010 losses and impairments such provisions would absorb around €360 billion of operating profits cumulatively between now and 2015.
The greater problem is whatever damage that balance sheets may have suffered since the start of the crisis which has yet to be recognised. The extent of unknown damage is unknown, and it may only apply to certain banks and in varying degrees. But areas of concern include:  Lehman Brothers bankruptcy was well under way, suggested that total write-downs of around $1420 billion, or somewhat more than €1000 billion, would be needed in the Euro Area and the United Kingdom between mid-2007 and 2010. These estimates included no allowance for sovereign debt problems and substantially exceed the recorded EU total for this period. While losses may simply have been over-estimated, it is possible that significant unrecognised losses from this period still exist.
 In particular, unresolved problems with property lending persist in some countries;  Many losses related to private sector involvement in the Greek rescue are only now in the process of being recognised;
 Other sovereign debt has lost any perceived risk-free status, especially where assets held in the banking book have not been marked to market;
Taxation
To the extent that losses and impairments do not absorb operating earnings banks are generally taxable on the balance. This has typically run around 30% of earnings, substantially reducing the scope for retentions. Furthermore, it should be noted that a number of countries have devised various taxes and levies designed to extract money from banks. For the Euro Area, the industry estimates that these will run to €5 billion p.a. and, for the United Kingdom, GBP 1-2 billion p.a. Over the period to 2015 this would amount cumulatively to €25-30 billion. Where these taxes can be passed on to depositors, say by structuring them as deposit insurance fees, they may play a useful role. But they will be counterproductive if they impinge on banks themselves as such taxes will serve to offset the forces working to recapitalise the system.
The overall picture
The current EBA capital exercise reviewed above is the first comprehensive effort to reinforce the capital base of Euro Area banks as was done in the United States and the United Kingdom following the Lehman Brothers collapse. But it comes much later and, leaving aside the support package for Greece, is much smaller in scale. The various magnitudes surveyed here suggest that much remains to be done, not just in the Euro Area but also in the United Kingdom.
Complying with formal Basel III rules should be no problem but both markets and supervisors have become more demanding. Future earnings can do much of the work during the next few years if the bulk of important losses relating to the US sub-prime crisis, real estate in some European countries and sovereign debt prove to have already been recognised. This assumes, however, that such earnings are not depleted by high taxation. It also assumes that virtually all earnings are retained until banks are sufficiently well-capitalised to feel comfortable about expanding balance sheets in ways that support economic activity.
It still seems likely that outside sources of capital will have to be tapped. To attract outside investors, it will be essential to allay concerns that large unrecognised losses may remain. These will be discounted by the market thus discouraging new investment. Conservative accounting which provides generously and realistically for losses on existing assets, to be borne by existing shareholders, is likely to be a pre-requisite for raising large amounts of capital from new investors.
This raises the question of whether there is scope for large public support for the banking sector, as in the United States and the United Kingdom following the Lehman Brothers collapse. It is difficult to separate this issue from ongoing sovereign debt problems in parts of the Euro Area given:  In the absence of compensating budget measures, direct funding to support banks requires issuing more sovereign debt. This is counter-productive in financially weak countries while it erodes the strength of financially strong ones.
 The perceived weakness of many Euro Area banks at least partly relates to their exposure, direct or indirect, to sovereign debt that is no longer perceived as risk-free.
To date EU countries have committed to providing large-scale support, more than €1 trillion when ECB bond purchases are taken into account, to sovereign borrowers. This has been supplemented by significant resources from the IMF, which provides scope for non-European funds to be added to support packages, and by "private sector involvement (PSI)" which commits private creditors to recognise losses and write down their holdings of sovereign debt. So far only €30 billion has been singled out for bank recapitalisation (as part of the Greek rescue), but a significant part of the combined EFSF/ESM ceiling of €700 billion remains unallocated and available to deal with future contingencies. Given the degree to which banking and sovereign debt problems threaten to aggravate each other, the best use of much of this money may be to strengthen the capital base of Euro Area banks to ensure that runs on deposits do not emerge in countries other than Greecewhich would put pressure on the entire European system of central banks" Target 2 mechanism.
In a previous paper the possibility of a large TARP-style recapitalisation of Europe"s banks was elaborated: the uncommitted EFSF/ESM funds could be used to capitalise an SPV sponsored by the EIB, which permits leverage and greatly augments resources.
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The ECB could even lend a hand if bridge funding were required for the EIB vehicle. Given the interconnectedness between banks, this recapitalisation should be much broader than just the periphery countries.
Regulatory biases against lending to private borrowers
The pressures on banks to strengthen their overall balance sheet, together with the normal "crowding out" engendered by the financing large budget deficits in a noninflationary way, will work to limit financing for private borrowers. In addition, the regulatory system now being introduced contains important biases working to make such lending more expensive.
Capital adequacy rules
Biases in the capital adequacy framework have worked for many years to discriminate against lending to the household and enterprise sectors as a result of favourable risk-weights for claims on cash, sovereigns and other public sector entities and on other banks. The high risk weights faced by private borrowers, now 35% for residential real estate, 75% for retail lending and 100% or more for corporate and commercial real estate lending other than corporate obligations rated A-or higher 23 , imply relatively high capital charges on such lending. Large enterprises, relatively few of which have ratings of A-or higher, and commercial real estate face the highest costs since small and medium-sized enterprises have considerable scope for being treated as households, benefiting from the 75% risk weight. Indeed, if an entrepreneur/small business owner is prepared to pledge his principal residence, his bank can take advantage of the 35% risk weight.
Liquidity rules
The new Basel III liquidity framework with its two new standards, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), may become a larger issue. This differs from the capital adequacy framework, which creates complex and important incentives but only sets minima for three capital measures. These consist of instruments OECD JOURNAL: FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS -VOLUME 2012 ISSUE 1 © OECD 2012 which banks themselves issue to fund the asset portfolio. The liquidity framework will not only create incentives affecting both asset and liability management but it will require large holdings of assets whose supply banks do not control. It seems likely to do so in ways that reinforce the main biases of the capital adequacy framework. The standards are being phased in slowly
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, allowing preparatory observation periods and scope for modification should unintended consequences become apparent. But, since banks can be expected to incorporate these into their activities in advance, their impact is probably already being felt.
Perhaps the most important bias results from the definition of high quality liquid assets, which banks need to hold continuously as a buffer to survive a hypothetical 30-day period of liquidity stress, under the LCR standard:
 The buffer must consist predominantly of "Level 1" assets, which are largely confined to 0% risk-weighted claims on central bank and public sector entities
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;  It can also contain "Level 2" assets, which include 20% risk-weighted claims on central banks and public sector entities as well as AA-or higher-rated corporate or covered bonds not issued by financial institutions.
 A 15% "haircut" is applied to all Level 2 assets, which cannot account for more than 40% of the total buffer.
 An important feature of the LCR is that the assets in the buffer must be unencumbered, i.e. not pledged (explicitly or implicitly) to secure, collateralise or credit-enhance any transaction.
Thus qualifying assets consist almost entirely of the same claims on public sector entities and central banks privileged by low risk-weights in the capital adequacy framework, which should work to reinforce demand for such assets. The major differences are that inter-bank claims are not included, due to concerns that these can become illiquid in a period of stress ("wrong-way risk"), while collateral for covered bonds may include commercial real estate mortgages (see below). It should also be noted assets eligible to serve as collateral at central banks do not necessarily qualify, and that senior unsecured claims on other banks and even very liquid equities are excluded.
Other sources of bias are built into the various behavioural parameters used to calculate that: (i) the expected cash outflow under stress which LCR rules require that the liquid asset buffer cover; and (ii) the "stable funding" aggregates that NSFR rules focus on:
 LCR rules treat secured funding as highly stable so long as: (i) the assets securing the funding are Levels 1 or 2; or (ii) the funding is provided by domestic public sector entities or central banks. Such funding will receive 0-25% weights to reflect likely run-off. All other secured funding is assumed to run-off 100% in the event of stress.
 NSFR rules treat cash, liquid short-term securities (< 1 year) and marketable claims on 0% risk-weighted public sector entities and central banks as highly stable, requiring only 0-5% stable funding. But loans of similar maturity to private borrowers require stable funding ranging from 50-85%. While high-quality corporate and covered bonds of longer maturity rated above A-qualify for 20-50% stable funding, everything else over 1 year needs 100% stable funding.
While these parameters merely create incentives, as opposed to requiring actual holdings as do the buffer rules, they again operate to favour the same asset classes: claims on public sector entities and central banks. Highly-rated corporate bonds and real estate qualifying for cover pools aside, claims on the private sector are effectively penalised. The bias operates not only directly on the asset side but also indirectly by privileging funding that is collateralised by favoured assets.
The international framework is increasingly being supplemented by moves in a number of individual economies to ring fence liquidity in their markets. These include the United Kingdom and some Asian jurisdictions with large international banking centres. Ring-fencing, which can apply at the branch as well as subsidiary level, requires internationally active groups to maintain their liquidity positions in individual markets on a stand-alone basis. This makes it difficult to manage liquidity centrally and to direct it where and when it is needed. It can also lead to conflicting pressures from home and host supervisors
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. Ring fencing seems likely to add to the need to hold the same high quality liquid assets that are privileged by the international framework.
Collateral and asset encumbrance
Given that all internationally active banks --in Europe, all banks --will need to hold large quantities of assets whose issue is beyond their control, it is useful to ask whether there are enough qualifying assets to go around. Given the size of many countries" budget deficits and outstanding debt adequate supply seems highly likely for the near future. But it is worth keeping in mind:
 As a number of countries have already demonstrated, continuing large deficits can put the high quality of sovereign debt and even its liquidity at risk, defeating the purpose of the buffer.
 EU countries are committed by treaty to delivering low deficit positions and many other countries are ambitious to do likewise once a recovery is clearly under way. Today"s supply of qualifying sovereign debt may not be indicative of tomorrow"s supply.
 The scope for high-quality private debt to supplement the supply of qualifying assets is very limited, mainly consisting of real estate mortgages. Collateral required for covered bonds otherwise consists mainly of the same assets which qualify as high quality under LCR rules and thus add nothing to overall supply. Highly-rated corporate debt, the remaining potential source of private supply of qualifying assets, is likely to remain highly-rated only if the issuer is parsimonious with supply. More issuers would be welcome, but banks are not in a position to influence this very much.
 Banks are not the only source of demand for high quality liquid assets. Other important buyers include insurance companies, pension funds and managers of foreign exchange reserves, notably in parts of Asia.
Some indication of the situation as it stood at the end of 2009 is available from the QIS exercises described above. For the G-20 bank sample only 4% of the total stock of qualifying assets consisted of private debt instruments, roughly split between corporate and covered bonds. In Europe the figure was around 9% with covered bonds reflecting essentially all of the higher stock 27 . In aggregate, the LCR in the G-20 sample was 83% for large banks, suggesting significant shortfalls at the level of the system, although it was 98%, or nearly in balance, as required, for smaller banks. In Europe these figures were 67% and 87% respectively 28, suggesting that large European banks face more pressure to acquire liquid assets and/or to adapt their operations to reduce their exposure to net cash outflows than their international counterparts. These figures mask a very large dispersion across banks. If the rules for 2015 were applied to end-2009 portfolios, shortfalls in liquid assets in banks in the G-20 sample which had shortfalls, some 54% of the sample, would have been €1.73 trillion. In Europe, in mid-2011, these figures were 66% and €1.15 trillion, respectively.
Assets qualifying for the LCR buffer must remain unencumbered and the required buffer seems likely to be very large, even if much can be done to reduce the stressed cash outflow which must be covered. LCR rules must be seen in context with a recent trend to increasing reliance on collateral to support bank funding. The major need for collateral in Europe has been in operations with the ECB, i.e. repos, the Marginal Lending Facility and, for most of the next three years, the LTRO. But the rising use of covered bonds (see below) to fund operations has also encumbered an increasing share of bank assets in cover pools. The assets which can serve each of these various purposes are not identical, in particular some ECB eligible assets and the real estate mortgages eligible for covered bond asset pools do not qualify for the LCR buffer. But there is a heavy overlap consisting of claims on public sector entities and central banks.
The importance of this is difficult to judge. The LTRO encumbers large quantities of assets but also creates them, in the form of cash balances at the ECB. It is scheduled to end in late 2014 and early 2015, just as the LCR rules become binding. Therefore, while there may be an issue of how they will interact during the LCR phase-in period their claims should not be additive afterwards. Also, while encumbering assets in the LCR will preclude their use as collateral for secured bank funding, it should not hurt the quality of unsecured funding instruments. This is because the assets are available in the event of bankruptcy.
On the other hand, the amounts involved are large. Market estimates indicate that for many large European banks encumbered assets, mainly related to repos and covered bonds, ranged between 15% and 35% of assets, ex derivatives, even before the LTRO
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. Since the LTRO these figures are likely to have risen significantly in those banks that took heavy advantage of the program. For strong banks this may not pose problems. But they don"t want to lend to banks that are less well-off and they may hold large amounts of cash at the ECB. On the other hand, the problem banks which lack the collateral to raise secured funds in the market may find it difficult to raise anything without collateral. They can easily become dependent on the ECB but, even there, may face a collateral eligibility issue.
Secured funding: covered bonds and securitisation
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Impediments to unsecured funding
The challenges banks face raising unsecured funding in the markets will be reinforced by the Basel liquidity and other regulatory frameworks, working to reduce demand for such instruments and thus to raise costs. For banks which might act as sources of funding, unsecured bank bonds (unlike high-quality corporate bonds) will not qualify as high quality liquid assets under LCR rules, making them unattractive. At the same time, they will require full stable funding under NSFR rules. For insurance companies in Europe, the Solvency II framework due to come into force in 2013 will discriminate against unsecured non-sovereign bonds by assigning them high risk-weights. Capital charges will also rise in line with the maturity of such instruments. In addition, such bonds may be subject to conversion to equity under "bail-in" provisions should the issuer be subject to emerging bank resolution regimes. And where depositor preference laws exist they will add to the perception that unsecured instruments are low quality. All this will reduce demand for such instruments.
At the same time, NSFR rules will oblige banks to find stable funding and issuing unsecured medium-to-long term bonds is an obvious way to do this. Upward supply pressures therefore seem likely to reinforce the effect of lower demand working to raise costs of such funding to banks. Indeed, since the Basel liquidity framework was proposed in December 2009, a notable divergence between unsecured bank bond yields and high quality corporate bond yields reflecting these forces has emerged (Figure 16 ). These costs will have to be passed on to bank customers. 
Collateralised securities
This points to increased use of collateralised instruments, the two most important of which are asset-backed securities (ABSs) and covered bonds (CBs). Both of these derive their value from being backed by a pool of assets, the main difference being that CBs provide holders with recourse to both the originator and the asset pool in the event of difficulties. ABSs are usually issued by a special purpose vehicle separate from the originator 31 . CBs are governed by the Capital Requirements Directive in the EU as well as by national legislation in a number of countries. In some countries frameworks have emerged on the basis of contractual agreements. These frameworks impose conditions for eligibility of assets for the cover pool and which govern how much of an originator"s portfolio can be allocated to the pool. These conditions serve to make CBs generally higher quality instruments than ABSs, reflected in AAA ratings for nearly 90% of European covered bonds.  Recourse to the originator should encourage better asset quality standards than were often displayed by ABSs during the recent sub-prime crisis and provides an additional layer of protection to holders.
 Reputational considerations in the aftermath of the crisis work against ABSs. Regulatory reforms needed to help in this regard may work to raise costs.
 CBs rated AA-or better will qualify as high quality liquid assets under Basel liquidity rules, after a 15% haircut, while only 20% of their value will require stable funding. This works to raise bank demand for CBs, relative to ABSs or unsecured bonds.
 CBs will be a way of raising stable funds under Basel liquidity rules, which will encourage supply.
 CBs, in contrast to unsecured bonds, are unlikely to be subject to "bail-in" conversions to equity.
 Large issues of CBs ("jumbos"), roughly half of the total outstanding, are generally more liquid than ABSs.
The result is that CB issues have continued at a high rate (Table 5) , although the sovereign debt crisis has acted as a restraining force, and this seems likely to continue.
A number of factors, however, seem likely to limit the growth of the CB market:
 Only restricted asset classes, generally mortgages and the same government securities that satisfy Basel liquidity rules, are available for cover pools. As a result, CBs are attractive to investors looking for a higher-yield alternative to government securities and serve primarily and increasingly to refinance fixed interest rate mortgages.
 Assignment of high quality assets to cover pools weakens the average asset quality of the remainder of the balance sheet. This can adversely affect market perceptions of a bank"s unsecured bonds and raise unsecured funding costs. In light of this caps are generally imposed on the share of a bank"s portfolio that can be devoted to cover pools
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 Structuring of cover pools and management programs can be expensive, which discourages smaller banks. In addition, weaker banks need to provide higher levels of collateralisation than stronger ones. This works to limit the market to the largest, most highly rated banks.
 Separate national frameworks fragment the market 34 which may limit liquidity.
Measures could be taken to address these issues and encourage further development of the CB market. However, these would not ease concerns about bank deleveraging and credit availability to the enterprise sector. So long as the framework privileges government bonds and mortgages, thus discriminating against non-mortgage lending to the business and household sectors, it reinforces biases of the Basel framework.
V. Deleveraging and G-SIFI bank business models
In section IV the issue of collateral encumbrance and the sufficiency of high-quality instruments for this purpose was discussed and the bias against lending noted. This issue is particularly important for the G-SIFI banks discussed in section III, where it was noted that loans from large banks to the private sector have not contributed to asset growth and total asset behaviour has been dominated by banks" derivatives exposures. Since 2008 there has effectively been no loan growth from the banks studied in the USA, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. In Switzerland the level of loans has actually fallen.
The crisis has led to extreme market pressures that have led to vastly increased demand for cash and other (typically sovereign debt) collateral in G-SIFI banks that impedes lending to enterprises. This has been strongly reinforced by regulatory trends: 35  OTC derivatives: when risk and volatility rise in the market the GMV rises with it.
This can be seen in Figure 17 , which compares the VIX with the derivatives of G-SIFI banks in the investment banking capitals. This typically causes collateral demands to rise. Most banks have vast derivative exposures but net them for regulatory purposes
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, and in low volatility periods there is little pressure on liquidity. But netting provides no shelter from market risk. The gross credit exposure (GCE), which is GMV after netting, can move suddenly in a market risk event and collateral demands can rise quickly as a consequence in a pro-cyclical way. At the same time the CVA charge proposed under Basel III would rise, increasing pressures and prompting CVA desks to hedge (with CDS trades). Banks, hedge funds and the like require cash buffers, since the failure to meet a margin call can result in bankruptcy. The demand for such buffers has risen as a consequence of the more volatile environment since the crisis.  Re-hypothecation, which results in collateral being re-used in prime broking businesses (resulting in a "velocity of circulation" of collateral), has the particular legal characteristic that clients (like hedge funds) that have not demanded segregated accounts become unsecured creditors in the event of a failure. Consequently, after some spectacular failures during the crisis, customers" demands for segregated accounts have risen and are putting more pressure on bank cash positions. Similarly, novation requests rise when banks are perceived as being vulnerable, and such requests require the transfer of collateral to the new counterparty. At the same time regulatory demands for segregated accounts are reinforcing this trend.
 Dealer banks operate with short-term repos style transactions to fund longer-term holdings. The environment since the crisis has led to tougher collateral requirements, including increased haircuts or higher quality (cash). Regulatory changes with respect to what is acceptable as collateral in some central banks and in clearing houses have also become tougher. Similarly, regulatory changes focusing on liquidity buffers (discussed earlier are coming into play).
 The perceived riskiness to lending to banks has also led to increased demands on cash and other high quality assets to serve as encumbered collateral to facilitate fund raising, as discussed earlier in relation to covered bonds. These trends mean that the demand for cash as collateral has risen for banks and shadow bank customers. In conditions prevailing since 2007, the inability of many banks to fund themselves in the market on the basis of their own name has at times led to or at least threatened G-SIFI bank failures, and they cannot expand traditional lending in such an environment. Central banks have responded with large infusions of cash to liquefy the system, shown in Figure 18 . This monetary base expansion has mainly replaced other inter-bank transactions in this volatile environment, as central banks have become the major suppliers of funds to money markets. But it has not been sufficient to restart the lending process. This is especially marked in Europe where, as illustrated in Figure 8 , lending standards to enterprises have been tightening in the face of reasonable demand. Some policy makers have questioned the use of central bank balance sheets in the above non-traditional manner, as portending potential inflation risk for the future and discuss the need to reverse these measures. Mechanically, there is little problem in reducing outstanding cash: central bank government bond portfolios can be reduced using open market sales and, especially in the Euro Area, loan repayments by banks, especially LTRO credit, would shrink central bank balance sheets rapidly. However, it has been argued here that there has been a structural shift in the demand for cash due to the GSFI business model itself, where OTC derivatives, repo financing and prime broking functions hold central banks hostage in the event of a crisis if bank failure and deleveraging are to be avoided. Reducing cash outstanding without policies to change the structure of G-SIFI bank business models could make the system more vulnerable to periods of stress.
The importance of separation: Vickers/Volcker/NOHC
This issue is inextricably tied up with the riskiness of the GISFI bank business model. The OECD has long proposed the separation of securities businesses from traditional banking since 2008, favouring a non-operating holding company (NOHC) structure. The US Dodd-Frank Act and the UK Vickers Report have come to similar broad conclusions on the need for business models to be changed by separating traditional banking from securities businesses. The three regimes are compared in Table 6 . . Three permitted activities, "underwriting", "market making" and prime broking serve as an illustration:
 Underwriting: is exempted from Dodd-Frank provided it is done on behalf of clients as a service, but not for profit driven by market prices. Yet underwriting a securities issue puts the banks capital at risk and it would be unreasonable to expect this activity to be undertaken without a profit incentive. If the book build on behalf of a client proves to be inadequate, so the issue of (say) a bond is under-subscribed, the bonds would have to be taken into the banks" own inventory and laid off later. The issue may have been mispriced, or fundamentals might change in the future, resulting in prices moving for or against the bank. This will result in profits or losses. The bank will need to have some profit motive in mind in running an underwriting business over time, or it will not be able to continue with this activity. Underwriting could simply migrate to the shadow-banking sector or to foreign banks not subject to the Volcker rule, which brings about separation. But depending on the final writing of the rules such proprietary risk may well be allowed to rest with the bank.
 Market making: this is also exempted if it is not done on a for-profit basis. Yet market making is inherently a form of proprietary trading. 41 The bank provides immediacy to a client by buying at a quoted price, taking the security into inventory, and laying it off at an average price over subsequent periods. As before, the bank will not undertake the activity if it cannot quote with a profit motive in mind to compensate the risk of adverse price movements in the uncertain future. This may lead to the migration of the business to elsewhere as a consequence of the Volcker rule. But if the interpretation is that the rules will allow it, then considerable proprietary risk is likely to stay in the bank.
 Prime Broking with a covered fund in which the banking entity has an ownership interest: these transaction are exempted provided they meet the de minimis rules (see Table 6 ), the bank provides no guarantees to the fund, and sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act (dealing with arms length transactions) are complied with. Prime broking, however, requires banks to provide immediacy to hedge funds in terms of the borrowing stocks and the execution of sales. These functions requires inventory -which drive profit and loss via short-term price movements that have to be managed with profit motives in mind.
The Dodd-Frank Act also has extra-territoriality issues that are more pervasive than Vickers or the NOHC:
 A foreign parent that owned a substantive share of a securities business abroad would not be allowed to own a depository institution in the USA unless all of its activities are executed wholly outside of the US, do not involve any US residents as counterparties and no personnel involved in the transaction are physically located in the USA.
 The exemption for dealing in US government debt does not apply to dealing in foreign government debt.
Deleveraging implications of separation
Whatever the philosophical differences between alternative approaches to separation, restructured bank business models are required to reduce the impediments to lending arising from periodic mark-to-market losses and short-term margin and other liquidity pressures. A natural split is traditional banking versus securities businesses. The former consists of deposit taking from mainly unsophisticated investors and lending to households and SMEs, all of which are strongly related to developments in the domestic economy and are based on less volatile amortised cost accounting. Deposit insurance should apply only to the retail customers of a bank, and not form the basis for TBTF cross-subsidisation of securities market activities. The securities business, on the other hand, consists of products whose prices are determined in international capital markets where fair-value-through-profit-or-loss accounting applies. Not only are earnings more volatile, but the bank is subject to extreme liquidity pressure in periods of volatility and stress, which may contaminate all business segments.
In the event of a crisis, a separated traditional bank could go on lending to households and SMEs regardless of what was happening to the securities market affiliates in the capital markets -there should be less deleveraging in the areas where local business depends on bank funding to provide jobs growth. The CEO of the separated securities business, on the other hand, would have to earn a profit with clients aware that it would have access to less capital in the event of failure, and that failure would be much less likely to result in the socialisation of losses. The price of securities firm risk taking would rise and the volume of business would fall. The securities firm would become a smaller business that would be less levered and less risky than was the case for, say, Lehman Brothers. Management would be more risk-averse and face a higher cost of capital. Clients" demand for collateral would not have to be accommodated by the central bank in periods of stress to the same extent as would be the case for a depository institution. Securities businesses would be less likely to fail and, if they did, they could be more easily resolved without the disruptions seen in 2008/2009, 2010 and 2011. 
VI. Concluding remarks
The global financial system reached a breaking point, where banks in the end proved unable to fund themselves in their own names. This point was arrived at as a consequence of:  Excess leverage; and  Excessively risky activities bundled into the business strategies of banking groups that could not manage them.
This pressured governments to intervene with capital injections and guarantees, and forced central banks to play a major role in bank funding. These problems have, however, continued well into 2011 and now with the euro crisis (and the JP Morgan insight) into mid 2012.
Bank management has overseen a period of deleveraging, which has been particularly severe in countries where the resulting recession exacerbated other structural weaknesses. Good deleveraging supposedly occurs where banks raise more capital, and "bad deleveraging" when they cut back on loans and other balance sheet components. Banks need substantial amounts of new capital, particularly tangible equity, and the regulatory process has succeeded in varying degrees in achieving this -though more in the Basel Tier 1 area than in actual equity and leverage prevailing in bank balance sheets. Bank lending has been relatively flat overall, and both Tier 1 capital and tangible equity have risen. But even after allowing for the different treatment of derivatives, Europe and Switzerland remain the most highly-levered jurisdictions. The US provides a useful example of how capital injections occur without costing the taxpayers in the longer run, once bank share prices improve. A TARP-style injection of equity capital into the highly interconnected European banking system would help to restore trust in banking, and prevent the risk of deposit funding shifts that put pressures onto the European System of Central Banks inter-funding mechanisms (Target 2).
On the funding side for G-SIFIs, the crisis has resulted in an increased premium on high-quality assets that can serve as collateral. The demand for such assets has risen as a consequence of: the margin requirements of the derivatives business; increased demands for segregated accounts that reduce the possibility re-hypothecating collateral; tougher collateral requirements for lending between banks; covered bank funding from the nonbank sector; and regulatory trends. Eligible collateral has a bias towards public sector assets: central bank cash and sovereign debt. This raises the cost of capital for lending to enterprises. Policies are required which will help to reduce this bias, and do so without relying on cross-subsidisation from TBTF banks. This requires policy makers to look again at the biases in liquidity rules and to continue with the progress made in some jurisdictions in removing TBTF distortions via Vickers and the Volcker rule.
A major part of the problem is the business models of G-SIFI banks. There is a need to separate traditional banking from capital markets banking. The former are linked with deposit taking and lending to households and SMEs driven by domestic demand and supply factors. Capital markets banking, on the other hand, is characterised by mark-tomarket gains and losses more closely tied to events in global financial market. This leads to highly-correlated influences on bank balance sheets which, despite attempts by bank management to smooth them, eventually must be booked as losses that an absorb excessive amounts of bank capital. More worryingly, periods of stress in capital markets can also result in a liquidity crisis that lead even more quickly to deleveraging and bank failures.
High and volatile interest rates have come down sharply since the first tranche of LTRO lending in December, so any calculations are highly speculative. If fully invested in ways that lock-in interest rates averaging 5%, €1000 borrowed from ECB at 1% would generate €120 billion over three years. But the success of the first tranche helped to lower interest rates to a point where it seems unlikely that such a high a margin could be achieved with the second tranche at the end of February.
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See Blundell-Wignall (2011) . This option is set out in items 7 and 9 of Basel II standardised system. Basel III does not alter the risk-weights.
24.
The LCR becomes effective 1 January 2015 and the NSFR on 1 January 2018.
25.
Where sovereign debt is non-0% risk-weighted, domestic banks may also include it among its Level 1 assets.
26.
In Europe, avoiding such conflicts is one of the issues that has motivated the European Bank Coordination "Vienna" Initiative. This aims to enhance coordination of national policies that could impact on emerging European economies, in some of which subsidiaries of international groups play an important role. For example, see Durden (2012) , quoting estimates by Barclays Capital.
30.
For good discussion of these issues see Packer et al. (2007) , and for a post-Basel III banking perspective see Uslenghi (2011) and Del Punta (2011). 31.
Other differences include impact on capital requirements of the issuer (CBs none, ABSs possible reductions); the frequent use of tranching with ABSs; and the replacement of assets in CB cover pools in the event of repayment or default, in contrast to ABSs where these are passed through to the holders.
32.
CBs have been used in Europe, especially in Germany and Denmark, for a long time. Much more recently the United State, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have all established covered bond frameworks too, although only in Canada have they so far been widely used.
33.
The EU maintains a sliding scale based on regulatory capital ratios and excludes banks with less than €500 million in regulatory capital altogether. Australia caps the amount to be placed in cover pools at 8% of assets.
34.
To take a case in point, new Australian legislation restricts mortgages in the cover pool to Australian property and excludes ABSs (Lonsdale, 2011) . Italian law, in contrast, authorises appropriate ABSs as well as derivative contracts tied to other authorised assets.
35.
For a fuller discussion of this see Blundell-Wignall (2011) .
36.
Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) is an additional up front charge to cover markto-market unexpected counterparty risk losses, valuing counterparty risk in bond equivalents and applying the market risk regulatory charge to such bond equivalents (after deducting the incremental risk charge on the trading book). The CVA is calculated within each of the netting sets, and is then added across netting sets. The bigger the netting sets the more scope there is for reducing the charge.
37.
The Australian legislation including the way restructuring instruments and transfer certificates may be used to create an NOHC structure is certainly worth examiningparticularly when so many banks claim it is too difficult to achieve. Australia"s Macquarie Group restructured in a matter of a couple of months. The structure is not, however, mandatory. One simple reason for this is that Australia is not an investment banking centre, and the same systemic risks do not apply on the scale of banks in the USA, the UK, France Germany and Switzerland. Just as they were with the Basel II rules, where regulatory arbitrage was rampant.
41.
See Duffie (2012) .
